# 7 CLOSET DRAMAS

Kieran Daly

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[1] These proper names, these dates, these appellations are the evental stage instructions of a text that might be passively foreclosed from event.

## *Classical dramatic structure*[2]

- "Act" function is represented by any *centered*[3] typeface
- "Scene" function is represented by any *centered* typeface subsequent to any "Act" (i.e. "Scene" is a subset of "Act")
- "Referent" function is represented by any *left-aligned*[4] typeface if and only if subsequent to any "Act" or "Scene" (i.e. Act/Scene = content)[5]
- Any left-aligned **bold** type may (not) function as parabasis[6]

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[2] cf. Pavis, P. (1998). *Dictionary of the theatre, terms, concepts, and analysis.* (C. Shantz, Trans.). Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (Original work published 1996).

[3] Command+Shift+Vertical Bar (|)

[4] Command+Shift+Left Brace ({)

[5] Otherwise termed "content" or what constitutes a dramatic work and is discretely identified and presented by an Act or Scene.

[6] cf. Sifakis, G. M. (1971). *Parabasis and animal choruses: a contribution to the history of Attic comedy.* London, UK: Athlone Press.

# *Dramatic units, natural numbers*[7]

<u>Stage directions</u>
- Any element x mapped itself to itself by an identity element $id_x: x \rightarrow x$. In other words, all x do not refer to anything except itself.
- Curtain fall (*fine*)
- Numbered Acts and Scenes given from Daly (2011).[8]

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[7] Conditions: The finite inscription of each mark imprinted on the present document.
[8] Daly, K. (2011). *Plays / For Theatre*. New York, NY: bas-books.

Act I.

<0,0,1>

Scene I.

<0,1,0>

Act II.

<1,0,0>

Scene I.

<0,0>

Act III.

<0,1>

Scene I.

<1,0>

Act IV.

<0>

Scene I.

<1>

Act V.

<,>

# Campanulaceae*, dramatic units,* Lycaenidae*, modal logic*[9]

<u>Randomly distributed stage directions</u>
- Fatalism
- Any element x mapped itself to itself by an identity element $id_x: x \rightarrow x$
- Unger, P. (1977). Impotence and causal determinism. *Philosophical Studies*, *31*(5), 289-305

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[9] Conditions: Leakage (not necessarily terrestrially-bound).

Act I.

**The propositional content of trivialism is total. The content of trivialism is equivalent to the totality of the content of all propositions. And because the content of trivialism is total, its assertion amounts to the assertion of the conjunction of each and every proposition. The trivialist asserts that $p_1$ and $p_2$ and $p_3$ etc., are all true. And this in turn is equivalent to the assertion of the conjunction of all propositions: $p1 \wedge p2 \wedge p3 \wedge \ldots$ For the trivialist, not only is every proposition in natural language both true and false, but every proposition is of identical content to every other proposition. The point then given Aristotle's argument is that because all propositions are identical (both in content and truth value) for the trivialist, she cannot practice actions such as choosing some propositions over others. They are all the same for the trivialist and so indistinguishable. For example, the trivialist would be unable to communicate an instruction to someone. This is because the trivialist believes that any set of words will do for such an act of communication (they do after all have identical meanings) and so could not have a reason for choosing one set over another.**

Mbashe River Buff.

*Cyanea dolichopoda* Lammers & Lorence.

*Deloneura immaculata* Trimen.

**How, within a logic founded on actions (or ordered movement), is the 'structural' similitude of two elements determined? The idea is quite simple. Take two elements a and b. Suppose that there is an arrow f from a to b. This means that an action originating from a 'affects' b, leaving a singular mark. Now suppose there is an arrow g from b to a (thus in the opposite direction) which, when linked to the action f, produces a null action. And the same applies if you act in the other direction: you go from b by way of g, then you return to b from a by way of f, and it's as if you haven't done anything. Obviously, under these conditions, the elements a and b are 'actively' identical, in that the singular marking of b by the arrow f from a allows itself to be cancelled out by an action leaving from this mark and returning to a. The two arrows (f, g) establish between the elements a and b a kind of 'inactive' correspondence, which, as always in category theory, is the sign of identity (identity as the halting of movement, or as movement without effect).**

Long-foot cyanea.

$p \rightarrow \sim(\Diamond p \wedge \Diamond \sim p) \vdash \Box p.$

Mbashe River Buff.

*Cyanea dolichopoda* Lammers & Lorence.

Every proposition has a designated value at some world. In the actual world every proposition has a designated value. Every proposition has a designated value at every world. For every x belonging to the world, x has the property F and no other property except F. In other words, x(W) = F. This world is a finite domain of concrete objects. These objects are, each of them, things which might not exist. The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the existence of any other such things. Thus, there is no necessary proposition or thing that all have an extrinsically designated unchanging value in this or every world, insofar as there was no thing in the first place to what this value referred.

Act I.

*Deloneura immaculata* Trimen.

$p \rightarrow \sim(\lozenge p \wedge \lozenge \sim p) \vdash \square p.$

Long-foot cyanea.

An occurrent is simple if it will obtain whatever processes involved are performed or not. However, after the inability to decide upon the existence of simple occurrences, simply fated occurrences' just denoted the empty class, since everything is fated together with something. Simply fated occurrences could then either (i) be those for which no actions forms a necessary condition; or (ii) more generally those for which no externally induced change is a causally relevant condition. Hence Chrysippus could have all occurrents caused, including simply fated ones; and yet for these latter the criterion for being fated simply is preserved; for there is no action (and generally no externally induced change prior to the occurrent) that is a necessary condition. Everything has been predetermined from eternity, and nothing is newly created when a thing happens.

Since propositions about future events are already true before any choice is made, and the value of such truth does not ever change, there is no way in which a choice can influence the occurrence of an event. Every proposition is already true before the existence of any conscious being. It seems to follow that all future facts and events are inevitable. But there is no choice about the inevitable. If all true propositions are true at all times, there is no choice whatsoever.

## *Dramatic units,* Fabaceae, Fagaceae, Liliaceae, Poaceae[10]

<u>Randomly distributed stage directions</u>
- Wieland (2012, p. 284)[11]
- Impasse (αδιέξοδος)
- $\Box P \rightarrow ((Q \lor \sim Q) \rightarrow P)$
- $\Box \sim P \rightarrow ((Q \lor \sim Q) \rightarrow \sim P)$

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[10] Conditions: N/A

[11] Wieland, J. W. (2012) Can Pyrrhonists act normally? *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action* 15(3):277-289.

**If one makes no judgement but thinks and does not think, indifferently, then what difference will there be between that one and the plants? Continuity, as universal generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general. No-thing necessarily resulted from the No-thing of boundless freedom indexical to the continuous generality of the universe. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle and do-no-thing potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness.**

Big bluestem.

Act I.

**It is impossible to conceive of a cause before apprehending its effect as its effect. For only then do we recognize that it is a cause of the effect, when we apprehend the latter as an effect. But we are not able to apprehend the effect of the cause as its effect if we do not apprehend the cause of the effect as its cause. For only then do we suppose ourselves to recognize that the effect is an effect of it, when we apprehend the cause as the cause of that effect. If, then, in order to conceive the cause it is necessary to have prior recognition of the effect, and in order to recognize the effect, as I said, it is necessary to have prior acquaintance with the cause, the circularity type of aporia shows that both are inconceivable, it being impossible to conceive the cause as a cause or the effect as an effect; for, since each of them needs credibility from the other, we do not know with which of them to begin the conceiving. Hence that anything is the cause of anything remains suspended of apprehension.**

Bur oak.

Post oak.

Largestipule leather-root.

Sexton Mountain mariposa lily.

*Calochortus indecorus* Ownbey & M. Peck.

*Orbexilum stipulatum* (Torr. & A. Gray) Rydb.

Big bluestem.

*Quercus macrocopa* Michx.

**There is a certain argument which is called the "Lazy Argument" by the philosophers; if we obeyed this we would do nothing at all in life. This kind of argument is rightly named lazy and idle, since by the same argument all activity will be removed from life. In the argument, all that is said about fate corresponds to the complementary pair either it is fated that P or it is fated that ~P'. According to this, like in Aristotle's version, it is not**

**fated that our side activities are governed by fate. Further, if one can choose between two excluding options, this would be in conflict with Cicero's claim that all activity will be removed from life. In his version, just the predicted outcome is fated though not the activity to decide between two options and to do one of them. We have options to choose freely between two appropriate activities (to call in a doctor or not), even without a corresponding impact on the fated outcome.**

**The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just no-thing at all … in which the whole universe is involved … not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something.**

*Quercus macrocopa* Michx.

*Quercus stellata* Wangenh.

**Equipollence compels the suspension of performance, insofar as a performance must have something to choose to be done over something else. As equipollence indexes the condition of suspension as its identity, such impossibility of performance compels not only the suspension of performer (any-one) but also performed: for no-one to have no-thing in particular to show. What the dramatic structure contingently constitutes is what has already immediately performed for itself qua self-belonging, and hence has no possible capacity to cause any thing else to happen as a consequence of such immediacy.**

Post oak.

*Calochortus indecorus* Ownbey & M. Peck.

*Quercus macrocopa* Michx.

Largestipule leather-root.

Andropogon gerardi.

Bur oak.

Sexton Mountain mariposa lily.

Big bluestem.

*Quercus stellata* Wangenh.

Act I.

*Orbexilum stipulatum* (Torr. & A. Gray) Rydb.

*Orbexilum stipulatum* (Torr. & A. Gray) Rydb.

# Boraginaceae, *dramatic units, epochē,* Fabaceae, Poaceae[12]

<u>Randomly distributed stage directions</u>

- $\alpha(a, b) \leq \beta[\varrho(a), \varrho(\beta)]$
- Nullipotence
- Initially, the series $\{a_1, \ldots, a_i\}$ must be ordered. Secondly, the predicate 'F' must satisfy the following three constraints: (i) it must appear true of $a_1$, the first item in the series; (ii) it must appear false of $a_i$, the last item in the series; and (iii) each adjacent pair in the series, $a_n$ and $a_{n+1}$, must be sufficiently similar as to appear indiscriminable in respect of 'F'—that is, both $a_n$ and $a_{n+1}$ appear to satisfy 'F' or neither do. Under these conditions, 'F' will have been immediately suspended from mediacy relative to the series $\{a_1, \ldots, a_i\}$ and any argument of the above form using 'F' and $\{a_1, \ldots, a_i\}$ will have been suspended from the possibility of mediacy.

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[12] Conditions: N/A

*Mertensia arizonica* Greene var. *leonardii* (Rydb.) I.M. Johnst.

*Bromus inermis* Leyss.

From August 1971-June 1972, 22.6%, 22.3%, 24.9%, and 19.6% of the initial material of western wheatgrass, needle-and-thread, blue grama, and a non-sorted mixture, respectively, were lost after 260 days. After 392 days of decomposition, losses amounted to 39.7%, 36.9%, 41.6% and 36.9%, respectively. The average ash content for all species was 8.3%, 10.8%, 12.5%, and 11% after 286, 321, 351 and 392 days respectively.

*Agropyron trachycaulum* (Link) Malte ex H.F. Lewis.

Scene I.

*Bouteloua gracilis* (Willd. ex Kunth) Lag. ex Griffiths var. *stricta* (Vasey) Hitchc.

Act I.

*Agropyron smithii* Rydb.

Εποχή.

**(a) Plant charge: Pyrrhonists do nothing, rather than act.**
**(b) Animal charge: Pyrrhonists happen, rather than act.**

Leaf and stem weights derived from selected samples in the fall and average leaf and stem weight after decomposition resulted in the following leaf-to-stem ratios: slender wheatgrass, 0.36, decreased to 0.24; smooth brome, 1.22, decreased to 0.96; mountain lupine, 1.50, decreased to 0.70; and tall bluebell, 0.89 decreased to 0.57. Average plant material losses ranged from 28.6% in slender wheatgrass to 44.9% in tall bluebell.

*Lupinus × alpestris* A. Nelson (pro sp.) [*argenteus × caudatus*].

*Hesperostipa comata* (Trin. & Rupr.) Barkworth.

**The null result of a sorites against F forces one to have no valid criterion by which to determine or apprehend the existence of F. If F is predicated upon its mediation with A = {a₁, …, aᵢ}, and sorites yields the suspension of apprehending F qua predicated, then what sorites yields is that the extinction or vanishing of F is redundant insofar as F had no possibility of determinably existing as such. Thus, F never went extinct or vanished because it never had the capacity to appear. If fate, the eternal causal chain of things that exist, has no contingency for the future, present, or past, then that which does not happen, i.e. the permanently—insofar as change needs cause—nonexistent, also has no contingency.**

*Agropyron smithii* Rydb.

Εποχή.

*Mertensia arizonica* Greene var. *leonardii* (Rydb.) I.M. Johnst.

Scene I.

*Agropyron trachycaulum* (Link) Malte ex H.F. Lewis.

22.6%, 22.3%, 24.9%, and 19.6% of the initial material of western wheatgrass, needle-and-thread, blue grama, and a non-sorted mixture, respectively, were lost after 260 days. After 392 days of decomposition, losses amounted to 39.7%, 36.9%, 41.6% and 36.9%, respectively. The average ash content for all species was 8.3%, 10.8%, 12.5%, and 11% after 286, 321, 351 and 392 days respectively.

**For x ∈ T, we always have μ ≤ x, where a transition (Ex = p) → (Ex = μ).**

Act I.

*Lupinus ×alpestris* A. Nelson (pro sp.) [*argenteus × caudatus*].

Leaf and stem weights derived from selected samples in the fall and average leaf and stem weight after decomposition resulted in the following leaf-to-stem ratios: slender wheatgrass, 0.36, decreased to 0.24; smooth brome, 1.22, decreased to 0.96; mountain lupine, 1.50, decreased to 0.70; and tall bluebell, 0.89 decreased to 0.57. Average plant material losses ranged from 28.6% in slender wheatgrass to 44.9% in tall bluebell.

*Hesperostipa comata* (Trin. & Rupr.) Barkworth.

*Bromus inermis* Leyss.

*Bouteloua gracilis* (Willd. ex Kunth) Lag. ex Griffiths var. *stricta* (Vasey) Hitchc.

# *Dramatic units, statistics[13]*

<u>Randomly distributed stage directions</u>
- N/A

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Non-parametric distribution.

Act I.

A probability distribution with an *a priori* unknown or unfixed parameter.

Act I.

Act I.

A probability distribution with an *a priori* unknown or unfixed parameter.

Act I.

Non-parametric distribution.

# *(undefined), parabasis, set theory*[14]

Randomly distributed stage directions
- A sample space $X = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots x_n\}$ with a constant mean value $\lambda$ under a parameter $\mu$
- That which does not appear, not even in the domain of pure thought, since otherwise it could be accounted for in terms of positive or negative judgments

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[14] Conditions: Overcompleteness.

Variation creates numerous problems. If we assume our performance and manufacturing specifications have been established correctly, any deviation from the target goal will result in degraded system performance and/or defective components. Variance increases unpredictability in product performance and in the quality and throughput of the factory. Process variance reduces the capacity of the factory because processes become either under- or over-utilized. Process variance reduces our ability to detect potential problems and increases the difficulty of discovering the root cause of problems—it is the enemy of performance.

We think that what is hot becomes cold and what is cold hot, that what is hard becomes soft and what is soft hard, and that the living dies and that it comes to be from the nonliving, and that all these things come to be different and that what was and what is now are not at all alike, but that iron, although hard, is worn away by contact with the finger, and also gold and stone and anything else that we think is enduring, and that earth and stone come to be from water. Hence these things do not agree with one another. For although we say that there are many eternal things that have definite forms and endurance, we think that all of them become different and change from what we see at any moment. Hence it is clear that we do not see correctly and we are incorrect in thinking that those many things are. For they would not change if they were real, but each one would be just as we thought.

(undefined).

(undefined).

$(\forall \alpha)[(\alpha \neq \emptyset) \rightarrow (\exists \beta)[(\beta \in \alpha) \And (\beta \cap \alpha = \emptyset)]]$.

A truly contradictory being must altogether lose its temporality insofar as it loses the possibility to change in time—its being is no longer subject to any future becoming. And for this very reason, a contradictory being is always be incapable of becoming otherwise, insofar as it's then always already that which it is not. A contradictory being even loses all capacity for living and dying—for insofar as it's incapable of temporally passing from being to non-being, conversely, both its very existence is already non-existence and its non-existence already exists. No new property is attributable to that which, by virtue of its contradictory nature, it doesn't always already possess. In short, a contradictory being, as such, is an absolutely necessary being because of its inability to change. However, by following the principle of factiality—and because we know that a necessary being is ontologically impossible (insofar as nothing can be both necessary and contingent)– we conclude that a paradoxical being is impossible.

(undefined).

(undefined).

$(\forall \alpha)[(\alpha \neq \emptyset) \rightarrow (\exists \beta)[(\beta \in \alpha) \And (\beta \cap \alpha = \emptyset)]]$.

**Pyrrho inverts the meaning of Eleatism by affirming that if the truth of the Immutable is derived from the inconsistency of appearance, this is precisely because the Immutable is Inconsistency itself –that is to say, Immutable Being is incapable of becoming precisely because everything and its opposite have always already been included therein.**

(undefined).

$(\forall\alpha)[(\alpha \neq \varnothing) \rightarrow (\exists\beta)[(\beta \in \alpha) \ \& \ (\beta \cap \alpha = \varnothing)]].$

## *Dramatic units*, *set theory*, Solidago *L.*[15]

<u>Stage directions</u>
- Non-self-identical abduction
- Castagnoli, L. (2007). Everything is true, everything is false: self-refutation arguments from Democritus to Augustine. *Antiquorum philosophia* 1:11-74.

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[15] Conditions: N/A

*Solidago* species provide vital sources of pollen and nectar for bees and other insects in the late summer and fall throughout North America (Mader et al. 2011). Insects known to visit *Solidago* species include beneficial solitary wasps and pollen-eating beetles such as the soldier beetle (*Chauliognathus pennsylvanicus*) and the black blister beetle (*Epicauta pennsylvanica*). Goldenrod and aster species are believed to be the preferred floral sources of many oligolectic bees such as *Andrena hirticincta*, *A. nubecula*, *A. placata*, *A. simplex*, *A. solidaginis*, *Colletes simulans armatus*, and *Melissoides druriella* (Mader et al. 2011). Honey bees collect large amounts of nectar from goldenrod prior to winter, and other bees use pollen from goldenrods to provision late-season nests (Mader et al. 2011). Goldenrods have a reputation of being weedy due to their aggressive rhizomatous growth, which enables them to rapidly colonize disturbed sites and causes them to be difficult to control. However in stable rangeland environments, they seldom achieve densities that are problematic (Werner et al. 1980; Whitson et al. 2004).

The relation between objects was defined as an oriented connection between the beings that underlie these objects, a connection that cannot create either difference or existence.

$$[\exists x: x \in \mathbb{S}] \; \forall y[(y \in \mathbb{S}) \supset (x = y)].$$

$\forall X, Y \in \mathbb{S}: X \neq Y \rightarrow X \cap Y = \emptyset.$

## Act I.

The prevent is both what comes before the event (pre-event) and what hinders the event (prevention). Entities understood from the perspective of the prevent are, in this way, generic: both static and final. As static, or common, such entities occlude further modification. As final, such entities are generic to the condition of occlusion from further modification.

$[\exists x: x \in \mathbb{S}] \; \forall y[(y \in \mathbb{S}) \supset (x = y)].$

$$\forall X, Y \in \mathbb{S}: X \neq Y \rightarrow X \cap Y = \emptyset.$$

$[\exists x: x \in \mathbb{S}] \; \forall y[(y \in \mathbb{S}) \supset (x = y)].$

## Act I.

*Solidago fistulosa* Mill.

*Solidago rugosa* Mill.

*Solidago altissima* L.

*Solidago fistulosa* Mill.

*Solidago rugosa* Mill.

*Solidago altissima* L.

**The impossibility of causal consequences or logical entailments of any kind to be generated.**

**USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. (2014). Classification for Kingdom Plantae Down to Genus Solidago L. Retrieved from http://plants.usda.gov/java/ClassificationServlet?source=profile&symbol=SOLID&display =31 (November 4, 2014).**

**Intermission.**